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Abstract 
 
Kant’s philosophy was an important background for the pragmatist tradition, even though 
some of the major classical pragmatists, especially William James, were unwilling to 
acknowledge their debt to Kant. This essay considers the relation between Kant and James 
from the perspective of their conceptions of the human condition. In particular, I examine 
their shared pessimism, employing Vanden Auweele’s (2019) recent analysis of Kant’s 
pessimism and arguing that this is required by James’s meliorism (which is put forward as 
a middle-ground option between optimism and pessimism). A comparative inquiry into 
Kant’s and James’s views on the relation between ethics and religion is provided against 
this background of their shared philosophical anthropology. 
 
Keywords 
 
James, Kant, meliorism, pessimism, religion 
 
Abstrakti 
 
Kantin filosofia toimi tärkeänä vaikuttimena pragmatistiselle traditiolle, vaikka moni klassinen 
pragmatisti, William James erityisesti, ei ollut halukas tunnustamaan velkaansa Kantille. 
Artikkelissa tarkastellaan Kantin ja Jamesin ajattelun välistä suhdetta heidän ihmisyyttä koskevien 
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käsitystensä kautta. Tarkastelen erityisesti heidän pessimismiään soveltamalla Vanden Auweleen 
(2019) tuoretta analyysiä Kantin pessimismistä, jota pidän välttämättömänä Jamesin meliorismille 
(jonka esitän optimismin ja pessimismin välimuotona). Vertailen tätä taustaa vasten Kantin ja 
Jamesin näkemyksiä etiikan ja uskonnon välisestä suhteesta. 
 
Asiasanat 
 
James, Kant, meliorismi, pessimismi, uskonto 
 
 
Introduction: transcendental pragmatism 
This paper examines the controversial relation between Immanuel Kant and William 
James, one of the founders of American pragmatism. While James famously, or 
notoriously, claimed philosophy to have progressed not “through” but “round” Kant from 
British empiricism to “the point where now we stand” (that is, presumably, his own 
pragmatism), respecting the “English spirit” as intellectually, practically, and morally 
“saner”, “sounder”, and “truer” than Kant’s (James 1978 [1898], pp. 138-139), a number of 
scholars have compellingly shown how profoundly Kantian many of James’s own ideas 
were – and how deeply Kantian the pragmatism he co-established thus more generally is.1 
The details concerning the complex relationship between Kant and James remain 
controversial for interpreters of both philosophers and for historians of pragmatism, but at 
an abstract meta-level it is relatively easy to identify important analogies between the two 
thinkers, despite James’s (at times arguably somewhat exaggerated) hostility toward 
Kantian apriorism and the heavy “German” style of philosophizing generally, which he 
seems to have considered a clear manifestation of a kind of “intellectualism” foreign to 
practical human life and its real concerns. 
Let me, in an introductory fashion, indicate some of Kant’s and James’s most 
significant points of agreement. First, in theoretical philosophy, especially epistemology 
and metaphysics, James shares what we may call Kant’s constructivism, at least in spirit if 
not in every detail of letter: the empirical world experienceable and knowable by human 
beings does not come to us as “ready-made” or “given”, equipped with “its own” pre-
categorized metaphysical structure, but is shaped by our cognitive capacities – not, to be 
 
1 See, e.g., Bird 1986; Carlson 1997; Pihlström 2003, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2013, 2020; as well as several 
contributions to Skowronski and Pihlström 2019. 
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sure, by a fixed and unchanging set of twelve categories of the understanding (according to 
James) but by our on-going and constantly critically revised practices of inquiry. That is, 
we cannot (and should not imagine that we can) know “things as they are in themselves” 
(Dinge an sich selbst) but only things that have to a considerable degree been structured by 
us, albeit obviously not created by us ex nihilo. 2  Some of the best Jamesian 
pronouncements of this general (quasi-Kantian) constructivism are Lectures II and VII of 
his Pragmatism (James 1975 [1907]), dealing with the pragmatic method and the 
metaphysical dependence of “things” on our purposes and interests, respectively.3 
Secondly, in practical philosophy (ethics) and the philosophy of religion, 
James, while of course firmly rejecting Kantian strict rationalist deontology in favor of a 
more experimental, non-apriorist, and non-foundationalist ethical approach, 4  can be 
interpreted as having come up with a way of postulating God’s reality (and possibly human 
immortality) in a way strikingly resembling Kant’s (1983 [1788]) famous “postulates of 
practical reason”. There is no way we could metaphysically or theoretically speaking know 
anything about God (or any other transcendent metaphysical and theological matters, 
including things in themselves), but our ethical orientation to life may nevertheless 
necessitate a theistic postulation, because otherwise we could not be coherently committed 
to what the moral law requires us to commit ourselves to, i.e., the highest good (summum 
bonum), the eventual harmony of moral virtue and happiness. For Kant as much as James, 
it may therefore be ethically necessary to have faith in God5 – though it must also be kept 
in mind that James’s God is a finite God, not the single over-arching absolute divinity of 
traditional theism. 
 
2 Regarding the denial of any human construction of the world ex nihilo, it is clear that both Kant and James 
are in some basic pre-philosophical sense realists: both maintain that there is something out there that we did 
not make up. It is better to speak about our “structuring” reality into a human shape than about our 
“constructing” reality, as the latter phrase has too radically constructivist connotations. 
3 Elsewhere, I have tried to interpret these key formulations of pragmatism and/or pragmatic constructivism 
as attempts to argue that our metaphysical “structuring” of the world is always also ethical, i.e., that there is 
no way in which ethical considerations could be eliminated from our metaphysical theorizing. See, e.g., 
Pihlström 2009, 2013. 
4 For James’s single most important essay on ethics, see “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life” (1891) 
in James 1979 [1897]; Marchetti (2015) provides one of the most insightful readings of this Jamesian text. 
5 It seems to me that James would have no difficulty in agreeing with the Kantian idea that “practical 
necessity can bequeath necessary, practical reality” to concepts that remain problematic from the point of 
view of theoretical reason, such as “the practical reality of autonomy” as well as the existence of God and the 
immortality of the soul (Vanden Auweele 2019, pp. 54-55). See, e.g., James 1985 [1902], Lecture III. This 
issue concerning our commitment to the practical reality of the object of religious faith will also be relevant 
to the considerations of the final substantial section of this essay. 
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In terms of Kant’s three famous questions – “What can I know?”, “What 
ought I to do?”, “What am I entitled to hope?”, presented toward the end of the first 
Critique (Kant 1990 [1781/1787], A805/B833; see also, e.g., James 1977 [1911], chapter 
2) – James is therefore a semi-Kantian thinker at least with respect to knowledge (we can 
only know a world that is to a great extent a result of our own structuring activity, albeit a 
more pluralistic and malleable one than Kant had maintained) and hope (we can 
legitimately hope that there is God, or that there are at least some kind of superhuman 
forces concerned with the “salvation” of the world, and that we might have an immortal 
life, though again there is much more plurality in the ways in which these beliefs are 
construed from the Jamesian pragmatic point of view in comparison to Kant’s). Moreover, 
even though the ethical question concerning what we ought to do is the one where the two 
philosophers are perhaps most obviously divided, the meta-level idea that religion and 
theology should be based on ethics rather than vice versa is something they deeply share. 
There is a sense in which ethics, for both Kant and James, comes first and orients our 
entire philosophical investigation, no matter what we are inquiring in philosophically, and 
therefore their profound agreement in ethics cannot be located in the content of ethical 
theory. 6  In particular, metaphysics (including the metaphysics of theism, or religious 
metaphysics generally) must be grounded in ethics, rather than the other way round (cf. 
Pihlström 2009, 2013).7 
Furthermore, James’s ethics, despite his tendency (as a pragmatist) to assume 
some form of consequentialism according to which the outcome of our actions is what 
ethically matters, is “Kantian” in the sense that we must be fundamentally committed to 
taking seriously other individuals’ perspectives, against a “certain kind of blindness” to the 
inner worth of others and a deafness to the “cries of the wounded” that we constantly hear 
 
6 Of course, in a sense James rejects the very idea of ethical theory (cf. again Marchetti 2015); this is a clear 
difference between the two philosophers, as Kant formulated one of the most important theories in the history 
of ethics. 
7 It is notoriously difficult to determine what exactly Kant means by “metaphysics” and in what sense, if any, 
he is (still) committed to a metaphysical project in the critical philosophy. For an excellent discussion, see 
Koistinen 2012. 
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around us.8 In fact, I will in the following suggest that this yields a key metaethical9 
similarity between Kant and James. 
It may be proposed that whereas Kant’s philosophy is generally known as 
transcendental idealism, James’s version of pragmatism – despite his rejection of Kant’s a 
priori transcendental method and some of the scornful remarks he makes about the use of 
the transcendentalist vocabulary – can be labeled transcendental pragmatism (see 
Pihlström 2003, 2009). This is above all because human practices, driven by our natural 
needs, interests, and purposes, provide a quasi-transcendental framework within which 
knowledge as well as moral deliberation are so much as possible. James as much as Kant is 
investigating the necessary conditions for the possibility of things we take for granted; he 
just (unlike Kant) locates such conditions in our constantly changing, historically 
transforming, and always reinterpretable human practices rather than any permanent 
ahistorical structures of our cognitive capacity. Another reason why this practice-oriented 
view is not very far from Kant’s general position is that according to Kant practical reason 
is ultimately “prior to” theoretical philosophy: even in its theoretical use, human reason is 
guided by the practical (moral) interest. James could not agree more profoundly about this 
idea. 
In the present essay, I will argue for James’s fundamental Kantianism by 
moving around these more familiar comparative discussions, however. It seems to me that 
several earlier contributions to the interpretation of Kant and James (among them possibly 
some of my own works) have already taken some steps toward demonstrating how deeply 
Kantian James’s pragmatic constructivism and his ethically grounded conception of 
religion are, insofar as a pluralistic “softening” of the original Kantian transcendental 
framework is regarded as a serious option (which, clearly, many Kantians would not do). I 
will, instead, move right through the theme that in my view unites Kant and James at the 
most fundamental level – that is, philosophical anthropology.10 After all, Kant maintained 
 
8 These phrases come from “On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings” (in James 1983 [1899]) and “The 
Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life” (1891, in James 1979 [1897]), respectively. 
9 By using this word I am not indicating that either Kant or James would have made a clear distinction 
between metaethics and (normative) ethics as contemporary ethical theorists tend to do. Rather, a kind of 
meta-level reflection on what ethics is – what constitutes a genuinely moral point of view – runs through 
these philosophers’ ethical writings; moreover, an ethical reflection seems to be constantly present through 
their entire writing. 
10 Cf. also my explorations of pragmatic yet transcendental philosophical anthropology in Pihlström 2016. 
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that his three questions can be summarized as the single question, “What is man?”, and it is 
precisely this question that James, as a kind of “transcendental humanist”, is also trying to 
answer (cf. also Carlson 1997). I will suggest that these two philosophers’ many 
similarities are basically a corollary of their shared conception of humanity, which can, 
perhaps contrary to some expectations, be regarded as pessimistic in an important sense.11 
After having devoted the bulk of this paper for a comparison of Kant’s and James’s 
(ethical and religious) pessimisms and meliorisms, I will add some final remarks on their 
shared commitment to critical philosophy. 
Jamesian meliorism 
Our reception of both Kant and James has, I believe, suffered from overly optimistic 
readings that may make them seem less sophisticated thinkers than they really were. Kant 
is often portrayed as a rationalist Enlightenment optimist who despite his faith in reason 
brings God back into his transcendental system through a backdoor, while James may be 
seen as a “positive thinker” inspiring (famously) not only the philosophy of life employed 
at Alcoholics Anonymous but positivity- and happiness-focused self-help more generally, 
including the theology of wealth and flourishing.12 This is in my view seriously wrong and 
needs correction.  
I have tried to argue on earlier occasions that James’s pragmatic method 
should actually be characterized as a “negative” method in the sense that it primarily 
focuses on the potential ethically problematic effects of our concepts and conceptions that 
are to be pragmatically examined (see Pihlström 2013, 2014, 2020). I now wish to draw 
attention to some new scholarly work on Kant emphasizing his negative and pessimistic 
conception of the human being. For my comparison of James and Kant, I will particularly 
use Dennis Vanden Auweele’s very interesting book, Pessimism in Kant’s Ethics and 
Rational Religion (2019), because his interpretation is unique in its emphasis on Kant’s 
 
11  I have previously (Pihlström 2008) suggested that for James “empirical meliorism” is based on 
“transcendental pessimism”, but at that stage I did not realize how crucial a certain kind of pessimism is for 
Kant himself. 
12 Note, by the way, that the analogy to recovery from alcoholism is not irrelevant even in relation to Kant, 
who compares our tendency to be tied up with evil to alcoholism; see Kant 1983 [1793/1794], 6:28n; cf. 
Vanden Auweele 2019, p. 21. Regarding James’s influence on positive thinking with a conservative Christian 
twist, Norman Vincent Peale’s inspiration by James has sometimes been mentioned (I am grateful to Ken 
Stikkers for this information). 
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pessimism.13 Not only Kant’s conception of the limits of human reason (on the side of 
theoretical philosophy) but also, and more importantly, his rejection of theodicies and his 
account of radical evil (on the practical philosophy side) are key elements of what may be 
regarded as his pessimism – a humanistic version of pessimism that deserves to be taken 
seriously also in a Jamesian pragmatist context. 
This is a form of pessimism that need not, however, destroy our ability to be 
good – either epistemically or ethically. Rather, it is a way of taking seriously our true 
human predicament in its epistemic, ethical, and existential fragility. I believe this is 
something that unites Kant and James at a fundamental level, and therefore Kantian 
pessimism needs attention in this context. 
Pessimism here needs to be understood as a transcendental ground for the 
very possibility of our being and doing good – of our striving for a better world, again both 
epistemically and ethically – to the extent that we can claim a kind of transcendental 
pessimism and empirical meliorism to be firmly integrated in James (cf., e.g., Pihlström 
2008). Kant’s pessimistic account of the human being arguably plays a crucial role in any 
pragmatist development of transcendental philosophy. At a meta-level, this interplay of 
pessimism and meliorism should make us rethink the philosophical anthropology at the 
background of both Kantian critical philosophy and Jamesian pragmatism. We must, Kant 
and James seem to agree, start from a reflexively critical analysis of our human situation, 
seeking to understand our finite and fragile condition as sharply and honestly as possible; 
only against that background of criticism can we pragmatically try to construct a better 
human world (epistemically and ethically). 
For Kant, such a critical analysis shows that we are unable to know anything 
about things as they are in themselves (including theological issues such as the existence of 
God and human immortality) and that we are not by our nature good but desperately need 
the moral law set by our autonomous reason in its practical use.14 For James, an analogous 
 
13 I find Vanden Auweele’s reading to be fundamentally in agreement with my own earlier work on Kantian 
“antitheodicy” (Kivistö and Pihlström 2016), though the actual theodicy discussion remains relatively brief in 
his book. 
14 An intriguing question (raised by one of the anonymous referees of this paper) is whether we should, 
according to Kant, nevertheless be able to know something about ourselves as “things in themselves” if we 
are able to know that we are not “by our nature” good, for instance (or, analogously, that our cognitive 
apparatus needs to use the categories). Whether the very idea of Kantian critical self-reflection of human 
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critical analysis starts from the impossibility of theodicies that would allegedly render 
suffering justified and from the framing of the very pragmatic method by the problem of 
evil, the recognition that there are real losses and real sorrows in human life, no matter how 
positively meaningful and flourishing our life could at best be (cf. Kivistö and Pihlström 
2016, chapter 5). Just as Kant’s Religionsschrift (1983 [1793/1794]) begins with the well-
known analysis of “radical evil” as a natural human inclination, James’s Pragmatism (1975 
[1907]) begins and ends with a discussion of the problem of evil and the rejection of 
theodicies. 
It seems to me that James indeed does not go “around Kant” but right through 
him when it comes to a certain kind of pessimism about the human condition. This might 
sound like an implausible reading of a philosopher who wrote essays such as “The 
Energies of Men” and “Is Life Worth Living?” (both in James 1979 [1897]); however, the 
key idea is not that meliorism would be wrong but that it is based on a deeper pessimism. 
Moreover, the specific word is not essential – we definitely do not have to talk about 
“pessimism” at all – but the general commitment to something like anti-optimism and the 
rejection of any naïve “positive thinking” are what matters. Indeed, a kind of quasi-
Jamesian moral “heroism” is precisely what is needed for the Kantian moral subject to 
overcome – even partially – the natural inclination to prioritize evil maxims instead of 
moral ones. Vanden Auweele (2019) rightly emphasizes throughout his book that from a 
Kantian point of view human nature has no inherent inclination to goodness but needs 
reason (the moral law) as its guidance. James may be slightly more optimistic about this 
specific matter, but he also argues that we need to be educated out of our instinctive 
blindness and deafness. For James, such education takes place through the employment of 
the pragmatic method taking seriously the potential practical results of our ideas, a method 
framed by an antitheodicist understanding of the problem of evil: neither Hegelian nor 
Leibnizian attempts to render unnecessary suffering meaningful in a transcendent sense 
are, for James, humanly acceptable, as they disregard the concrete experience of the 
victims of evil and suffering (cf. James 1975 [1907], Lecture I). 
 
reason needs some kind of access to our own nature at the level of things in themselves, after all, is a problem 
I must leave open here. 
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We should thus follow James (ibid., Lecture VIII) in viewing pragmatism as 
proposing a form of meliorism reducible neither to naively optimistic views according to 
which the good will ultimately inevitably prevail nor to dark and cynical pessimism 
according to which everything will finally go down the road of destruction.15 Pragmatism 
generally mediates between a number of implausible philosophical extremes (including 
strong realism and idealism as well as the tough-minded and tender-minded 
“temperaments”), 16  and similarly Kant’s transcendental philosophy mediates between 
(again) realism and idealism as well as, say, rationalism and empiricism and dogmatism 
and skepticism. The mediating role played by meliorism is part and parcel of the more 
general pragmatist-cum-Kantian picture of the human being. This is how James 
characterizes pragmatism’s commitment to meliorism: 
Now it would contradict the very spirit of life to say that our minds must be 
indifferent and neutral in questions like that of the world’s salvation. Anyone who 
pretends to be neutral writes himself down here as a fool and a sham. […] 
Nevertheless there are unhappy men who think the salvation of the world 
impossible. Theirs is the doctrine known as pessimism. 
Optimism in turn would be the doctrine that thinks the world’s 
salvation inevitable. 
Midway between the two there stands what may be called the 
doctrine of meliorism […]. Meliorism treats salvation as neither inevitable nor 
impossible. It treats it as a possibility, which becomes more and more of a 
probability the more numerous the actual conditions of salvation become. 
It is clear that pragmatism must incline towards meliorism. (Ibid., 
137.) 
Earlier in the same volume, James contrasts meliorism with determinism, 
because the latter claims that “necessity and impossibility between them rule the destinies 
of the world”, while the former “holds up improvement as at least possible” (ibid., 61). 
Pragmatism figures as a pluralistic philosophy of promise and hope, refusing to take 
 
15  Excellent relatively recent discussions of James’s meliorism can be found in commentaries such as 
Marchetti 2015 and Campbell 2017; see also several relevant essays in Goodson 2018. 
16 I have discussed this mediating role of pragmatism on a number of earlier occasions, e.g., Pihlström 2008, 
2013. 
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“salvation” for granted (like dogmatic religious outlooks optimistically tend to do), nor 
claiming it to be impossible (as materialist and determinist views hopelessly 
pessimistically do, with their bleak picture of an ultimately inhuman universe), but the fact 
that such a promise is needed in the first place follows from our highly insecure, 
vulnerable, and both epistemically and ethically incomplete human condition. 
In particular, sincerely understanding this incompleteness is essential in our 
ethical relations to other human beings around us. More specifically, James’s (1983 
[1899]) well-known examination of “a certain blindness in human beings”, as an 
inclination or tendency to overlook the significance of otherness and other human beings’ 
distinctive points of view that might make their lives meaningful in ways we cannot easily 
understand, is analogous (or even James’s own version of) Kant’s treatment of “radical 
evil”, which is also an inclination (Hang), i.e., the tendency rooted in us to choose maxims 
contrary to the moral law – an inclination to evil (Hang zum Böse). These notions reflect 
the two philosophers’ fundamental agreement about transcendental pessimism. According 
to both, we need to be educated out of these inclinations. This happens, in Kant, primarily 
by the practical use of reason (which ultimately leads to religion, as we will note below), 
and in James by an engagement in holistic practices more generally (that is, not merely 
reason-use as such), religious practices included. Both are versions of the idea that human 
beings need to be enculturated in order for them to be able to be moral – to adopt a 
“strenuous mood”, as James memorably put it. Pessimism and meliorism work together 
here, as it is only on the grounds of pessimism that the melioristic project of making the 
world – especially human beings – better makes sense. This ultimately amounts to a 
thoroughly pragmatic philosophical anthropology. 
Without appreciating a basic vulnerability in the lives we share with other 
human beings, no “cries of the wounded”17 can be heard, and no pragmatic method can get 
off the ground. Therefore, James’s physiological metaphors of human finitude should be 
taken seriously as fundamental to his pragmatism: he finds both deafness (to what he calls 
the cries of the wounded) and blindness (to others’ experiences in general) significant to 
his analysis of our responses – or, better, failing responses – to vulnerability and suffering. 
 
17 On this key Jamesian notion, see, for further discussion, Putnam and Putnam 2017, as well as Kivistö and 
Pihlström 2016, chapter 5. 
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In an opening comment to the 1899 “blindness” lecture, he notes: “Now the blindness in 
human beings, of which this discourse will treat, is the blindness with which we all are 
afflicted in regard to the feelings of creatures and people different from ourselves.” (James 
1983 [1899].) Similarly, the human being, according to Kant (1983 [1793/1794], 6:32), “is 
by nature evil”, and this fact about our condition manifests itself in our disregard for moral 
duty when it comes to our natural pursuit of happiness. 
It must be noted, however, that there are also important divergences between 
Kant’s and James’s distinctive accounts of our inclinations to evil. For Kant, radical evil is 
not merely the empirical tendency to prioritize one’s own happiness, well-being, or 
personal needs and interests in contrast to the moral law (though this is of course 
something we have a tendency to do, according to Kant); it is, more strongly, our free 
choice of maxims that prioritize happiness to moral law, that is, our tendency to freely 
choose to follow maxims that conflict with the categorical imperative. Our autonomous 
reason is self-divided here. It is crucially important for Kant that we are responsible for 
these choices and prioritizations and that we are therefore, indeed, “radically” evil (“at the 
root”, recalling the Latin etymology of radix); the unhappy choice arises from ourselves. 
Ultimately, our tendency to freely choose to be evil in this sense is as inexplicable and 
incomprehensible as our acting (when morally good) out of pure respect for the moral law 
as moral subjects (see ibid., Book I).18  
Kantian pessimism 
It is, arguably, precisely due to the “radical” character of evil (in the etymological sense of 
radix) that human beings are unable to achieve by their own efforts what Kant in the 
second Critique (1783 [1788]) called the highest good (summum bonum); in this pursuit 
commanded by the moral law itself (and thus by our practical reason), we seem to need, in 
addition to our autonomous reason, something like divine grace, and we need to be able to 
legitimately hope that we might deserve such grace on the basis of our moral commitment. 
James (1979 [1909]) revisits an essentially similar idea when he advances pragmatism as a 
pluralistic philosophy of hope, insisting that we need to do our best in the effort of “moral 
 
18  Cf. Bernstein 2002, chapter 1. Furthermore, in Pihlström 2014, chapter 1, I suggest that we might 
understand Kant’s notion of radical evil in terms of Charles S. Peirce’s metaphysics of “real generals”, such 
as habits and dispositions; the extent to which this realistic Peircean account is compatible with James’s 
somewhat more nominalistic pragmatism (cf. Pihlström 2009) is another matter and cannot be discussed here. 
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salvation” while at the same time trusting that other (superhuman) agents will do their best, 
too.19 
We should, however, now take a slightly closer look at the way in which 
pessimism figures in Kant’s practical philosophy and philosophy of religion, in particular. 
Here I will help myself to Vanden Auweele’s insightful reading. He defines “Kantian 
pessimism” as a view emphasizing “the lack of any capacity for human nature to be or 
navigate toward moral goodness”, entailing that “human nature requires a radical 
revolution through means exceeding that nature” (Vanden Auweele 2019, p. xvi; see also 
p. 65), and he strikingly suggests that pessimism is not merely a part of Kant’s philosophy 
but is present “in the whole of his philosophy” (ibid., p. xviii). In some more detail, he 
summarizes Kantian pessimism as the conjunction of three theses. First, human nature (or 
natural processes generally) “do by themselves not facilitate moral goodness”; indeed, 
there is “something profoundly amiss with human nature”. Secondly, therefore, our 
development toward goodness “must include a radical change”; in terms of the radix 
etymology, again, human nature needs to be “altered from the ground up”, not merely 
trained or reformed. Thirdly, Kant espouses a skeptical view about our actually being able 
to reach the highest good. (Ibid.) The human being simply does not have a “holy will” that 
would not experience a conflict between moral duty and natural inclination (ibid., pp. 44-
45, 51). This seems to be a similar kind of transcendental anthropological “fact” about us 
as, say, our not possessing the faculty of “intellectual intuition” that would know its objects 
directly without the mediating role of the senses (as analyzed in the Transcendental 
Aesthetic of the first Critique).20 
Note, however, how close Kant’s pessimism comes to Jamesian meliorism. 
As Vanden Auweele puts it, this pessimism “does not cancel out the possibility of a better 
future, but warns against the belief that natural processes by themselves navigate toward 
that end. Progress is hard and difficult, not inevitable.” (Ibid., p. xx.) What is required is 
“moral education that cultivates and augments [our] rational interest in moral behavior” 
 
19 In the Religionsschrift, Kant also mentions “supernatural cooperation” (1983 [1793/1794], 6:44). 
20  Vanden Auweele (2019, p. 109) in my view aptly characterizes the propensity to evil as “an 
anthropological idea of a transcendental nature, meaning it applies universally to human beings but is 
contingent to their nature”. Analogously, human finitude and mortality can be claimed to be “transcendental 
anthropological” features of human existence (Pihlström 2016). Whether there is a sense in which these 
concern us qua things in themselves (cf. note 14 above) cannot be settled here, though. 
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(ibid., p. 20). Accordingly, just as the Jamesian meliorist may still have confidence 
(however meager) in the possibility of a better outcome, or “moral salvation” of the world 
(for which the assistance of “higher powers” may be needed), the Kantian pessimist does 
not claim human beings to be “necessarily corrupted” but only “naturally corrupted” (ibid., 
p. 101; cf. pp. 109, 116): the Hang zum Böse rooted in us does not make morality 
impossible for us but only very difficult. Otherwise the very pursuit of moral goodness (a 
pursuit we have a duty to engage in) would become an incoherent requirement. Moral 
virtue must still be a human possibility; our nature cannot be so thoroughly (necessarily, 
unavoidably) corrupted by our propensity to evil that we could not even aim at being 
morally good – to even occasionally occupy what James called the “strenuous mood”.21 
The possibility of moral goodness in this sense only concerns human beings, because 
neither angels (who would possess a “holy will”) nor mere animals would be able to act 
virtuously due to a conflict between duty and inclination. 
Another potential comparison to James would also be highly natural here: 
perhaps our way to goodness is something that only opens through a radical conversion 
(see the relevant sections on conversion in James 1985 [1902], Lectures IX-X). At least in 
Kant’s view, no minor adjustments are sufficient, but human nature needs to be “radically 
sculpted” to “overhaul” its natural behavior (Vanden Auweele 2019, p. 65); what is needed 
is a “dramatically changed second nature”. While this kind of radical moral education is 
difficult, Kant is not a thoroughgoing or absolute pessimist in the sense that he would deny 
its possibility. James’s position may also be seen as cautious if not skeptical regarding our 
ability to achieve the highest good – or “moral salvation”, as James calls it – as it is not 
easy for us to overcome the blindness that comes naturally to us. Moreover, we may note 
that just as radical evil and moral blindness are analogous notions in these two thinkers, so 
are the ethico-religiously central concepts of the highest good and the moral salvation of 
the world.22 While Kant urges us to be committed to moral duty despite its difficulty, 
James offers us an uncertain universe with responsibility: 
 
21 The second and third book (Stücke) of the Religionsschrift can, I think, be read as an extended argument 
concerning the way in which the good can nevertheless overcome our evil propensity – but not without 
religion. In James, too, the hope for moral salvation is inextricably tied up with his defense of the possibility 
or even pragmatic necessity of adopting a religious outlook. 
22 It might be suggested that the Jamesian idea of “moral salvation” comes close to Kant’s hope that “the 
world must be moralized” (Vanden Auweele 2019, p. 126). 
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It is then perfectly possible to accept sincerely a drastic kind of a universe from 
which the element of ‘seriousness’ is not to be expelled. Whoso does is, it seems to 
me, a genuine pragmatist. He is willing to live on a scheme of uncertified 
possibilities which he trusts; willing to pay with his own person, if need be, for the 
realization of the ideals which he frames. (James 1975 [1907], pp. 142-143.) 
For James, this “trust” may also be directed, religiously, at “superhuman 
forces” that may assist us in advancing the moral ideal of salvation (ibid., p. 143). In the 
Kantian context, a “conversion” to moral seriousness despite the uncertainty of our 
condition is, however, primarily a rational and ethical one. Because our human nature does 
not possess the tools to reach moral goodness, we require “the intervention of reason that 
radically remodels nature” (Vanden Auweele 2019, p. 5). This ultimately leads to religion 
(see also below), but we cannot hope to just volitionally adopt a religious faith because of 
its beneficial effects in our moral pursuits; as Vanden Auweele notes (ibid., p. 23), Kant 
rejects Pascal’s Wager as firmly as James (1979 [1897], chapter 1) does.23 Yet, we do need 
actively embraced human faith in order to direct our behavior from what we merely 
naturally are to what ethical duty – in our “strenuous mood” – requires. Insofar as the key 
to Kant’s pessimism is our inability to be naturally good (that is, our inclination to evil 
instead of moral virtue), for James the fundamental problem seems to be that the very 
possibility of morality is endangered by the fact that we appear to be living in a material 
world devoid of any higher meaning and value, if the scientific account of the world is on 
the right track. For both, we need to overcome our nature and become fully human – and 
this is itself an irreducibly ethical quest. 
While Vanden Auweele does not explicitly speak about transcendental 
pessimism (or meliorism, for that matter), his reading of Kant fits very well my attempt to 
reconcile transcendental pessimism with empirical meliorism. He notes that “the rationally 
justified hope for a future in which humanity is set right shines so powerfully that one is 
blinded to the darkness it is supposed to cover up” (Vanden Auweele 2019, p. 22). Rational 
hope does shine, but we can only notice it against the pessimistic darkness around it. 
Again, the same holds for James’s melioristic conviction that things can be made better 
while success is never guaranteed. 
 
23 On the similarities between Kant’s practical postulation of God and James’s “will to believe” idea, see, 
however, Pihlström 2013. 
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There is no need to here dwell on the way in which Kant (1983 [1791]) in his 
“Theodicy Essay” firmly rejects all actual and possible (e.g., Leibnizian metaphysically 
optimist) theodicies allegedly rendering evil and suffering (or “counterpurposiveness”, 
Zweckwidrigkeit) meaningful and (in some sense) purposeful.24 It suffices to observe here 
that antitheodicism (as I like to call it) is an essential element of Kant’s pessimism. There 
is no way in which we could by our limited rational resources justify the evil and suffering 
we find around us in the world we live in; moreover, it can be suggested that our moral 
duty to treat other human beings not merely as means but also as ends (according to the 
second formulation of the categorical imperative) would have to preclude the 
instrumentalizing tendencies of theodicies, i.e., the temptation to see others’ suffering as a 
means to some imagined higher end. 
No rationalist dogmatic faith in a harmonious divine plan rendering all 
counterpurposiveness ultimately purposeful can thus be humanly accepted, because it is in 
the end a form of the “blindness” James criticized, though not exactly in the same sense. It 
is a form of blindness (and deafness) due to its inability to appreciate the experience of 
utter meaninglessness in suffering. In this antitheodicism, Kant and James stand united.25  
Ethics and religion 
As was already remarked above, the Jamesian pragmatic postulation of God’s existence – 
based on a “will to believe” leap (cf. James 1979 [1897]) – resembles the Kantian 
rationally legitimate hope for God’s existence as a “postulate of practical reason”. This 
leap, or hope, is necessary for us (given the kind of beings we are, and given the pessimism 
sketched above), because otherwise we cannot be fully committed to the requirements of 
morality. It is, thus, for melioristic reasons that we need to take the “will to believe” step 
toward practically postulating a Kantian divinity that (we may hope) can ultimately 
guarantee justice as the harmony of virtue and happiness, though, given our pessimistic 
condition, we can never know for sure anything about such an outcome. 
 
24 Vanden Auweele’s (2019, pp. 7-10) brief discussion of this issue is solid, though it fails to deal with Kant’s 
very interesting reading of the Book of Job – a serious omission in my view (cf. Kivistö and Pihlström 2016, 
chapter 2). Kant’s account of that ancient text arguably sets the tone for a number of more recent, and very 
different, antitheodicist projects, including James’s. 
25 For more on this topic, see my previous engagements with the theodicy issue and antitheodicism, including 
Pihlström 2013, 2014, 2020; Kivistö and Pihlström 2016. 
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On the basis of the considerations of meliorism and pessimism, it is possible 
to further deepen our comparison between Kant and James by noting how closely similar 
their ways of subordinating religion to morality are. It is through religion – to which our 
reason in its limited condition brings us – that our blindness and our propensity to evil may 
be (partially, temporarily) overcome and the moral pursuit strenuously advanced – to the 
extent that we may (again) follow Vanden Auweele’s (2019, pp. 131, 173) suggestion 
according to which Kant’s philosophy of religion is “an integral part of practical 
philosophy by making religion into a tool for cultivating moral resolve”, and the functions 
of religion are to be subordinated to the ethical one. They are also to be subordinated to 
ethics according to James as well. 
An obvious question that arises here is how sincerely a morally motivated 
religious believer can adopt religious faith, knowing that it ultimately only plays an 
instrumental role for advancing ethical rather than religious ends. This is a question that 
comes up as clearly in the Kantian context (see ibid., chapter 6) as in the Jamesian one (see 
Pihlström 2008, chapter 2; 2013, chapter 1). If religion is only, or even primarily, intended 
to help us adopt the strenuous mood and pursue moral ends that ought to motivate and bind 
us independently of religion, does it have any autonomous or even any genuine role to play 
in our lives? If we were fully conscious of the primarily (or exclusively) ethical function of 
religion, this would be “the end of religion”; a truly Kantian form of Christianity would, 
rather, have to be embraced without our being aware of its essentially serving our “moral 
courage” (Vanden Auweele 2019, p. 191). This is how Vanden Auweele formulates the 
worry: 
Religions can only achieve its [sic] function, that is, to cultivate moral resolve, if 
they are taken to be true, not if they are adopted because it is prudent to adopt a 
religion. One believes in Christianity because one thinks Christianity is true, not 
because one thinks Christianity would be prudent to believe in (this would make for 
a hypocritical believer). (Ibid., p. 192.) 
In other words, the morally instrumental function of religion is problematic 
for the sincerity of religious faith. “Instrumental belief is not real belief” (ibid., p. 193), and 
therefore our realizing the “practical usefulness” of religious belief would destroy that 
belief qua religious. As was already noted above, Kant just like James later rejected 
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Pascal’s Wager, which (at least according to a received view) 26  proposes to infer the 
rationality of religious faith from the beneficial outcome of that faith (and from the fact 
that its probability, however small, is not zero). 
This “sincerity objection”, as we might call it, is arguably a worry that can be 
raised with full force only in the context of the kind of Kantian-cum-Jamesian pessimism-
cum-meliorism that has been sketched above. We may be persuaded by Kantian and 
Jamesian arguments that religion is necessarily, at least in the sense of practical necessity, 
needed for us to be able to overcome our instinctive blindness and/or our natural 
inclination to prioritize evil maxims. It is only a short step from this insight to the 
conclusion that this is all religion is ever needed for. Could religious faith, then, even turn 
into a kind of placebo therapy that we know “works” but not because there is a “real” 
objective mechanism there but because such a motivating force tends to be effective for 
beings like us with our cognitive and ethical condition, including our limitations? At least 
it would seem that for a placebo effect to be real we cannot know that the therapy involved 
really has no efficient power. Paradoxically, for our being able to effectively “use” religion 
as a “tool” for our moral resolve, we must not know, or perhaps not even be able to know, 
that it is “merely” such a tool. We must, in some sense, be able to be sincerely committed 
to religion without having climbed onto a reflective meta-level affirming the moral value 
of such commitment – yet this sincerity itself must arise from our ethical stance toward 
religion. 
It is, it seems to me, essentially the same kind of sincerity that Kant 
emphasizes when he rejects theodicies in the Theodicy Essay and that he also praises in an 
eloquent footnote toward the end of the Religionsschrift. This is, indeed, what Kant finds 
the most striking feature in Job’s character in contrast to Job’s “friends” (who seek to 
formulate theodicies, in contemporary parlance). 27  More precisely, Job’s key virtues, 
 
26 I am not saying that there could not be a reading of Pascal’s Wager that would bring it somewhat closer to 
either Kant’s or James’s view, or both. I am not taking any stand on the interpretation of Pascal here. 
27 While I have in this essay relied heavily on Vanden Auweele’s in my view excellent account of Kantian 
pessimism, which includes the rejection of theodicies (as manifestations of a kind of misdirected theological 
optimism), Vanden Auweele curiously neglects Kant’s very important engagement with the Book of Job 
(which is the starting point for the entire antitheodicist inquiry in Kivistö and Pihlström 2016). He (Vanden 
Auweele 2019, p. 193) does draw attention to Kant’s praise of sincerity in Religionsschrift, though. This is 
what Kant says: “O Aufrichtigkeit! du Asträa, die du von der Erde zum Himmel entflohen bist, wie zieht man 
dich (die Grundlage des Gewissens, mithin aller inneren Religion) von da zu uns wieder herab? […] Aber 
Aufrichtigkeit (dass alles, was man sagt, mit Wahrhaftigkeit gesagt sei) muss man von jedem Menschen 
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according to Kant, are his “sincerity of heart” (Aufrichtigkeit des Herzens) and “honesty in 
openly admitting one’s doubts” (die Redlichkeit, seine Zweifel unverhohlen zu gestehen), 
which establishes “the preeminence of the honest man over the religious flatterer 
[Schmeichler] in the divine verdict” (Kant 1983 [1791], 8:267): 
Job speaks as he thinks, and with the courage with which he, as well as every human 
being in his position, can well afford; his friends, on the contrary, speak as if they 
were being secretly listened to by the mighty one, over whose cause they are passing 
judgment, and as if gaining his favor through their judgment were closer to their 
heart than the truth. Their malice in pretending to assert things into which they yet 
must admit they have no insight, and in simulating a conviction which they in fact 
do not have, contrasts with Job’s frankness [Freimütigkeit] […]. (Ibid., 8:265-266) 
At this point it might be suggested that the Kantian prospective believer 
actually needs Jamesian meliorism to overcome the pessimism that now extends to our 
ability to invoke religious considerations in any serious and sincere sense in this context. 
Within the Kantian system itself, the sincerity of religion may indeed be lost, as Vanden 
Auweele correctly worries. In brief, it may be suggested that from a pragmatic point of 
view our sincere faith may itself bring its own verification along with it – and this is 
something that seems to be available to James but not (at least not fully) to Kant. This 
would be an example of a case in which the employment of the Jamesian “will to believe” 
strategy is pragmatically legitimate; after all, one of the types of cases that James (1979 
[1897]) considers in “The Will to Believe” is precisely the case where strong belief is 
required for the belief itself to be able to be (made) true. 
However, even here (at least when we are examining the religious case) it 
seems that we do need to make sure the faith that is to be voluntarily embraced is sincere to 
begin with. It cannot be – any more in the Kantian than in the Jamesian situation – adopted 
merely for instrumental reasons or on purely practical and functional grounds due to results 
or benefits that would be external to it. Its moral worth needs to be something that sincere 
faith “internally” (inherently) carries with it, even if the contingent outcome were not to be 
 
fordern können, und, wenn auch selbst dazu keine Anlage in unserer Natur wäre, deren Kultur nur 
vernachlässigt wird, so würde die Menschenrasse in ihren eigenen Augen ein Gegenstand der tiefsten 
Verachtung sein müssen.” (Kant 1983 [1793/1974], 6:190n.) 
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realized, after all. Only by adopting such a pragmatic faith in God’s reality can the 
potential pragmatic Kantian be both genuinely religious and genuinely ethical. 
From the Jamesian pragmatist point of view, it could even be suggested that 
the “truth” of religion pragmatically amounts to its ethical functionality in our lives. That is 
to say, Vanden Auweele and many others who fail to approach the Kantian issue of 
sincerity from the Jamesian pragmatist standpoint rely on an essentially non-pragmatic 
dichotomy between the issues concerning the theoretical truth (vs. falsity) of religion, on 
the one hand, and the practical usefulness or functionality of religion, on the other hand. If 
we frame our examination of the relation between religion and ethics in a thoroughly 
pragmatist manner, this dichotomy must itself be overcome. The practical – i.e., ethical – 
functionality of religion is constitutive of its pragmatic truth, or in other words, the 
theoretical “metaphysical” truth of a religious outlook is its pragmatic functionality in the 
(would-be) believer’s system of belief, which is ultimately their (form of) life in a holistic 
sense.28 Pragmatism, after all, is for James a “philosophy of hope”, but this notion of hope 
must not be contrasted to Kant’s but rather be understood as fully congruous with Kant’s 
treatment of religion in terms of legitimate rational hope. 
It will inevitably remain an open issue here whether Jamesian pragmatism 
can ultimately keep its promise of delivering a melioristic account of religion that does not 
rely on a dichotomy between ethical or pragmatic and purely theoretical truth but can, 
rather, resolve the question of sincerity that seems to arise in the Kantian context which 
proposes to account for religion in terms of practical reason. The main conclusion for us 
(for now) is that it is right here that Kant and James are deeply engaged with essentially the 
same problem. In my view, Kantian practical (moral) theism needs to be informed by 
Jamesian pragmatist considerations in order for the sincerity issue to be adequately dealt 
with. But in the context of the present inquiry this remains a mere hypothesis to be further 
critically tested by means of both historical and systematic investigation. It could, for 
instance, turn out that from Kant’s perspective there is a sense in which a religious attitude 
 
28  At this point, a comparison between the Kantian-cum-Jamesian position formulated here and the 
Wittgensteinian tradition in the philosophy of religion naturally invites itself (cf. also Pihlström 2013). 
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“comes first”, after all, and the critical account of the moral grounds of religion only gives 
a voice to those who already have religious faith.29 
It is, at any rate, an essential element of Kantian-cum-Jamesian sincerity that 
naïve optimism is rejected across the board, both in ethics and in religion. Therefore, the 
sincerity needed in the formulation of a properly Kantian (and Jamesian) religious faith is 
essentially the same sincerity that we need for the rejection of theodicies, along the lines of 
Kant’s Theodicy Essay, and therefore the kind of pessimism briefly analyzed above is a 
key element of such sincerity. Only by taking others’ meaningless and non-
instrumentalizable suffering philosophically – ethically – seriously can we hope to 
formulate anything like an adequate account of morality and religion; overcoming 
theodicies is, indeed, part of overcoming the “blindness” James was (sincerely) worried 
about. 
Conclusion: humanism and critical philosophy 
It is impossible to defend the transcendentally pessimistic conception of humanity (as 
articulated above) without a fundamental commitment to what Kant called critical 
philosophy. The chief task of philosophical inquiry is always critical.30 Critical philosophy, 
broadly understood, integrates the Kantian pursuit of reason and the Jamesian pursuit of 
the holistic and pluralistic development of “the whole man in us”. It is (only) through 
critical philosophy that we can establish methods of conversion that might (but also might 
not) lead to moral goodness and progress. 31  It is, moreover, (only) through critical 
philosophy that we become aware of the kind of pessimism we need to be committed to in 
order to sincerely understand our human condition, especially the Kantian inclination to 
 
29 This was interestingly, though controversially, proposed by one of the anonymous reviewers. If such a 
reading were to be developed, then Kant’s critical views on the relation between ethics and religion might, as 
the reviewer suggests, be usefully read against the background of the pre-critical essay, “Der einzig mögliche 
Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes” (Kant 1983 [1763]). Furthermore, as the other 
anonymous reviewer notes, there might be resources available within the Kantian position itself for a view 
supplementary to the pragmatist response to the sincerity issue, i.e., an account explaining how religion could 
provide a “primitive essentially non-conceptual” (or “moral-intuitional”) “grasp of absolute non-instrumental 
value that cannot be rationally secured otherwise”. Again, I must leave these suggestions open here. 
30  Note also that among the pragmatists, John Dewey defined philosophy as “the critical method of 
developing methods of criticism”; see the closing comments in Dewey 1986 [1929], p. 354. 
31 Furthermore, such a critical inquiry into our human condition could utilize Kantian sources I have not been 
able to analyze in this essay (especially pertaining to Kant’s philosophy of history), such as “Idee zu einer 
allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlichen Absicht” (Kant 1983 [1784]) and perhaps also “Das Ende aller 
Dinge” (Kant 1983 [1794]). 
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evil and the Jamesian instinctive blindness. For the uncritical (naïve) gaze, these 
unwelcome features of our existence are not visible. In a more pragmatist terminology, we 
need a genuine – again sincere – commitment to inquiry, also in ethical and theological 
matters. 
To engage in critical philosophy – or pragmatic inquiry – in pursuit of the 
kind of melioristic account based on the background of pessimism is, moreover, to be 
committed to a Kantian-cum-Jamesian humanism, in contrast to various currently popular 
transhumanist, posthumanist, or antihumanist ways of thinking. The inquiring subject that 
critically turns toward a reflection on their own capacities and limitations is a human 
being. The question “What is man?” indeed integrates all the three Kantian questions. 
James, we may conclude, essentially shares Kant’s humanistic conception of the human 
being; to be a pessimist, or a meliorist, is to be a humanist seriously, and often painfully, 
concerned with the human condition.32 
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